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a b s t r a c t
Innovative use of ICT applications is rapidly becoming a cornerstone of modern government
policy ineveryareaof service, careandcontrol. Lookingbeyondthe individualapplicationsand
layers of digitisation, we find a hodgepodge of information flows running within and between
the various public authorities, policy domains, and crossing the public/private boundary. This
has consequences for the relation between government and citizens. Step by step, decision by
decision, theeverydayworkof government is changing ‘the rulesof thegame’ andgiving rise to
“information Government” (iGovernment), without this being based on any overall strategic
agenda or awareness amongpolitical decision-makers. This article places this development in
a new framework and suggests a perspective on a necessary paradigm shift.
ª 2012 J.E.J. Prins, D. Broeders, H.M. Griffioen. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Modern ICT offers government many promising opportunities
to speed up work processes, increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of policy, offer better andmore customised services,
and lighten the load of bureaucracy. Under the banner of the
eGovernment, ICT has been introduced to make government
streamlined, digital and service-minded while at the same
time catering to the needs of the citizen and “client”. More
recently, ICT is increasingly being used in policymaking in the
care sector and in the interest of public safety and interna-
tional security. Innovative use of new technologies is rapidly
becoming a cornerstone of modern government policy in
every area of service, care and control.
At the same time, the dynamic nature of ICT changes the
“rules of the game” and thus influences the interaction between
government and the citizen, between different government
organisations, and between government and business. Infor-
mation flows between various government organisations
sometimes crosses the boundaries between the public and
private sectors. Given the vast quantities of information stored
and collected, governments increasingly base their dealings
withcitizensoncategorisationsandprofiles, leaving thosesame
citizens powerless and empty-handed in instances where the
information turns out to be incorrect or incorrectly interpreted.
Furthermore, government is often seemingly unwilling or
unable to set limits to its own appetite for collecting data: it is
much more likely to find reasons to gather more information
than to curb its own curiosity. However, when it comes to new
technology and, in particular, the information flows that new
technology generates, government has a double responsibility.
Government must find a way to navigate between the con-
trasting demands of using ICT innovatively in policy and policy
implementation, and protecting citizens against the foreseen
5 This article is based on a 2011 Dutch report entitled iOverheid. The report was written by the Scientific Council for Government Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid e WRR), an independent scientific advisory body to the Dutch government. It was
published in English as: J.E.J. Prins, D. Broeders, H. Griffioen, A.G Keizer & E. Keymolen, iGovernment, Amsterdam University Press 2011.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
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and unforeseen effects of ICT, in particular those related to
complex information flows.
This article places the rapid developments within govern-
ments in the information age in a new framework, that chal-
lenges that of eGovernment, i.e. themain framework in which
government now relates to ICT. We will argue that empirical
developments in the realm of government and ICT reveal the
limitsof theeGovernmentparadigmand thenshift our focus to
adifferentperspective,whichwe refer tohereas iGovernment.
This new perspective raises pointed and urgent questions that
haveso farnot receivedtheattentiondue to them.Byzeroing in
on the information Government, we focus on the information
flows rather than the individual technologies and applications
which are the building blocks of eGovernment and show that,
far from being “engineered” by politicians and policymakers,
iGovernment is in fact “emerging” in a very real and empirical
sense. This raises questions about how iGovernment is to
evolve further and about the relationship between the citizen
and government within that context.
2. eGovernment
2.1. The rise of eGovernment
In the early days of eGovernment, in the early 1990s, govern-
ments regarded ICT primarily as a tool for streamlining their
own (internal) organisation and processes, in particular with
respect to policy implementation. Under the “eGovernment”
banner, ICT quickly became all-pervasive and the emphasis
gradually shifted from the internal organisation to the
“outside”, i.e. to policies aimed at increasing the effectiveness
and efficiency of services delivered to citizens and busi-
nesses.1 eGovernment plans and strategic agendas typically
presented a positive view of new technology2 and policy-
makers placed a high trust in the promise of digitisation. ICT
was essentially regarded as a neutral tool that could be used to
achieve certain policy aims faster, better and more efficiently
without seriously influencing or changing the primary policy
process. As a result there was generally little concern for the
context in which ICT and eGovernment programmes were
being introduced, or for the foreseeable and unforeseen
effects that the use of new technologies often entails.3 Tech-
nology was “rolled out”, work processes were “streamlined”
and services were “updated”. “Techno-trust” prevailed.4
With the steady growth of government ICT over the years
there were growing concerns regarding the interaction, coordi-
nation andcoherence of the various systems that proliferated in
thebackofficeofgovernment, specificallywithrespect toservice
provision.5 These concerns focused mainly on the technical
aspects, such as interoperability and open standards, andmuch
less on the implications of a fast growing network of data and
information sources. Neither was theremuch discussion on the
dependencies andvulnerabilities createdby the interoperability
of digital information and on the implications of coordinating,
networking andexchangeof data betweenorganisations.When
vulnerabilities at the level of information architecture and
exchange were acknowledged, they were sometimes immedi-
ately countered with new forms of technological “neutralisa-
tion”: technology itself was put forward to neutralise the risks
associated with technology. “Privacy by design” and “privacy
enhancing technologies” (PETs) became new buzzwords to deal
with the side effects of digitisation, such as the loss of privacy.6
Because politicians often lacked the resolve to see the
implementation of such policies through, they have not turned
out to be the solutions that theymight have been.7 The focus on
technology and applications also resulted in a case-by-case
approach to the digitisation of government services by politi-
cians and policymakers. Each new digital tool, database and
application was debated and decided upon in isolation of the
many other initiatives in neighbouring policy domains and
governmentorganisations.eGovernmentwasfirmlybuilt on the
idea of improving government servicese transforming citizens
into consumers in thepassinge andusing the buildingblocksof
a myriad of separate technological applications and innova-
tions. The resulting information structures and networks, and
the organisational and social consequences thereof, weremuch
less of a concern to the policymakers that built it.
2.2. The limits of the eGovernment perspective
If we look beyond the individual applications and layers of
digitisation introduced within the context of eGovernment,
we find a hodgepodge of information flows running within
and between various government authorities. It is extremely
rare, however, for government policy to explicitly acknowl-
edge and prioritise information and information manage-
ment. Step by step, decision by decision, the everyday work of
government is giving rise to a growing networked information
structure, which is not based on any overall strategic agenda
of, or even awareness among, political decision-makers. The
vast wealth of networked information that is developing
under the banner of eGovernment has come into existence
without a policy blue print. As a result, its growth appears to
have no “natural” limits. The fast pace of digitisation is driven
by considerations of effectiveness and efficiency and, in the
post 9/11 world, increasingly by considerations of security.
Other considerations, such as freedom of choice and privacy,
have often come under pressure when debating and imple-
menting new applications.8
1 V.J.J.M. Bekkers & S. Zouridis, “Electronic service delivery in
public administration: Some trends and issues”, International
Review of Administrative Sciences 1999, 65: 183e195.
2 J.L. Gomez-Barrosso, C. Feijoo & E. Karnitis, “The European
policy for the development of an information society: The right
path?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008 46 (4): 787e825.
3 See for example D. Johnson and J. Wetmore (2009, eds.) Tech-
nology and society. Building our socio-technical future. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press; see also B. Latour (2005) Reassembling the social. An
introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
4 J.E.J. Prins (ed.), Designing e-government, The Hague 2007:
Kluwer Law International.
5 P. Dunleavy, H. Margetts, S. Bastow & J. Tinker, Digital era
governance: it corporations, the State, and e-government, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2006.
6 European Commission, A fine balance: privacy enhancing
technologies: How to create a trusted information soci-
etydsummary of conference, Brussels 2005.
7 Prins et al. (2011) iGovernment.
8 Prins et al. (2011) iGovernment.
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Empirically, a number of developments in the digitisation
and informatisation of the public sector have taken modern
government beyond the notion of eGovernment. The state’s
appetite for the collection and storage of personal information,
the networking and pooling of personal information between
various public e and sometimes also private e organisations,
dataminingandprofilingofpersonal informationwithaviewto
pre-emptive policies and the growing mismatch between the
horizontal flow of information in data networks on the one
hand and the vertical organisation of responsibility and
accountability that ischaracteristicofgovernmentontheother,
all point towards the limits of the eGovernment paradigm. The
opportunities that ICToffers, and thepolitical opportunismand
techno trust, propel these developments and take the empir-
ical, and we argue the political, reality far beyondwhat may be
covered under the flag of eGovernment. The developments
outlined below in the following sub-sections require a different
perspective, that of the iGovernment, to analyse and under-
stand them.We will set out this perspective in section three.
2.2.1. The ever growing bureaucratic appetite for digital data
Public authorities have always had a natural inclination to
gather information in order to govern society on the basis of
that information. Torpey observed that the state first
‘embraces’ society in the informational sense before ‘pene-
trating’ society in order to take effective action.9 To this end
the state gathers as much information as possible, by means
of a finely meshed administrative infrastructure, and then
uses that information across the full breadth of government
policy. The potential to ‘embrace society’ has increased
dramatically in the digital era, and will indeed continue to do
so in the foreseeable future. At the national level the number
of databases and information networks have proliferated in
most western societies, ranging from digital versions of
‘classic’ administrations (birth,marriage and death) to various
new additions holding increasingly diverse and ‘soft’ personal
information, such as indications for risk and vulnerability.
At the international and European level, there is also
a noticeable trend to collect and exchange information, not in
the least in thedomainof ‘home security’.Manynewdatabases
havebeen introducedorarebeingdevelopedataEuropean level
that collect, store and cross reference personal and biometric
data of travellers, migrants and citizens of member states.10
Data exchange is also a key development in the international
fight against terrorism and other security related international,
especially transatlantic, cooperation.11 EU member states and
the US can make generous use of these databases, either
directly or indirectly, thanks to a range of treaties and official
rules, complemented by what is for most e including the
European Parliamente an unknown number of vague bilateral
and informal agreements.12 The European Data Protection
Supervisor has warned repeatedly against the almost innate
desire to expand and accumulate data, the tendency to merge
policy issues and data sets e primarily security and migration
policy e and the inclination to overestimate the reliability of
new technologies, in particular biometrics.13 The European
Parliamenthas also repeatedly criticised informationgathering
and data exchange efforts in the area of Justice and Home
Affairs, but until the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect, it did not
have the formal authority to exercise democratic supervision.
The Council of Ministers usually “took note” of the EP’s objec-
tionswithout amending the proposals towhich they pertained.
But it is not just governments that are collecting and
producing data. Many new tools to produce, gather and
disseminate information are invented outside the context of
government, by both companies and private citizens. Social
networking and social media, data on the behaviour of buyers
and shoppers online and various sorts of personal information
collected in the private sector generate a potential goldmine of
digital trails and footprints.14 That information can also be
used, within the relevant margins and statutory frameworks,
to satisfy government’s information needs. At the same time,
the mere fact that such information exists only serves to
encourage those information needs. There are no natural
limits to information gathering e that too is often considered
on a case-by-case basis e nor are there clear guidelines on the
extent to which the public and private sectors are allowed to
overlap ‘informationally’. Citizens thus become more and
more transparent, not in the least to their own governments.
Already in 2004, Richard Thomas, the UK’s Information
Commissioner at the time, warned that we were ‘sleepwalk-
ing into a surveillance society’.15 On the other hand, govern-
ment has so far shown little interest in interacting with
citizens or even in sharing information with them, although
more recent developments such as open government in the
USA harbour the promise of more transparency.16 Although
9 J. Torpey, “Coming and going: on the state monopolization of
the legitimate means of movement”, Sociological Theory 1998, 16
(3): 239e259.
10 D. Broeders, “The new digital borders of Europe. EU databases
and the surveillance of irregular migrants”, International Sociology
2007 22 (1): 71e92.
11 Hert, P. de & B. de Schutter (2008) ‘International Transfers of
Data in the Field of JHA: The Lessons of Europol, PNR and swift’,
pp. 299e335 in B. Martenczuk & S. van Thiel (eds.) Justice, Liberty,
Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations. Brussels: VUB
Press, see also: Balzacq, T. (2008) ‘The policy tools of securitiza-
tion. Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 46, nr. 1, pp. 75e100.
12 P. Hobbing & R. Koslowski, The tools called to support the
“delivery” of freedom, security and justice: A comparison of
border security system in the eu and in the us, Ad Hoc Briefing
Paper, European Parliament, Directorate-General Internal Poli-
cies, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional
Affairs, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE
2009, 410.681.
13 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European
data protection supervisor, Brussels, 20 January 2006.
14 See for example S. Baker (2008) The Numerati. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin and V. Mayer-Schönberger (2009) Delete. The
virtue of forgetting in the digital age. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
15 Quoted in: I. Brown and D. Korff (2009) ‘Terrorism and the
proportionality of internet surveillance’, European Journal of
Criminology, vol. 6 no. 2: 119e134.
16 See for example: Patrice McDermott (2010) ‘Building open
government’ in: Government Information Quarterly, vol. 27, nr.4, pp.
401e413, for a more critical view of the programme see: Alon
Peled (2011) ‘When transparency and collaboration collide: The
USA Open Data program’, in: Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology, vol. 62, nr. 11, pages 2085e2094.
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government espouses transparency and although trans-
parency is also onmany a citizen’s wish list, in practical terms
the authorities seldom go much beyond good intentions. The
potential is there, including in the tools made possible by ICT,
but political will and resolve are lacking. As a result, trans-
parency is often a one-way street: the citizen is transparent to
government, but not the other way around.
2.2.2. Networking the government, virtualising the citizen
Governments increasingly let personal informationoncitizens
flow through information supply chains and networks to
support their policy processes. Storage and exchange of
information between various public authorities is now faster
and more efficient. In chain informatisation networks, infor-
mation is passed from one organisation in the chain to the
next; in proper networks, however, information is exchanged
or managed collectively without it being passed along a fixed
sequence of actors. Unlike supply chains, networks offer
various alternative paths to information-sharing. Information
can move in one direction, in different directions simulta-
neously, in reciprocal directions, and alongmultiple branches.
Connections can also be strong or weak, single or multiple.17
The dynamic, flexible and adaptive nature of a network
makes it difficult to coordinate andcontrol.18 It is thereforealso
very difficult at times to decide who is responsible for specific
information about citizens that circulates in networks. Who
has ‘ownership’ and is responsible for safeguarding the accu-
racy of that information? Sometimes a network is also aweb in
which citizens can become entangled or become the victim of
identity fraud.19 In The Netherlands, even the Office of the
National Ombudsman was unable to track down the complex
chain of interactions that led to a well publicised and debated
case of identity fraude theKowsoleea casee so that the record
could be set straight. The Office concluded: “Chain computer-
isation can perhaps solve certain administrative problems and
quicken the pace of innovation in government, but there is
little reason to rely too much on its effects”.20
The organisation of government information in networks
is also at odds with the way government itself is organised.
Government is a collection of semi-autonomous hierarchi-
cally organised bureaucracies (departments, agencies etc.)
that are in essence vertical. In contrast, the information in
networks usually flows horizontally. This inherent tension
between networks and hierarchy has consequences for
ensuring that the system as a whole meets vital quality
standards e specifically the process-based principles of
accountability and transparency. It is highly problematic if
governmental information networks become so dominant,
that organisations are linked in terms of information flows but
not in terms of institutional arrangements. Questions relating
to accountability and transparency must be taken up at the
level of networks, both legally and organisationally, in order to
prevent accountability and transparency from falling through
the cracks of the current organisational structure. Supervision
and control are largely tailored to eGovernment and are
organised, as a matter of either policy or law, to the partitions
of the individual policy areas. A networked government is at
odds with the way in which ministries, Parliamentary
committees, regulatory bodies, and legal protection and
complaints procedures are set up. It is vital, however, for
citizens to knowwho is accountable; it is vital for government
to know this too so that it can safeguard the quality of infor-
mation and ensure the trust of citizens in the longer term.
2.2.3. Blurring the boundaries between the policy domains of
‘service’, ‘care’ and ‘control’
Thesharp increase indata storageandcomputingcapacity and
the growing level of interoperability betweendifferent systems
means that, in the infrastructural sense, the possibilities for
networking information far exceed the classical eGovernment
focus ongovernment services. This infrastructural ‘revolution’
facilitates a number of policy-related and organisational
developments that have radically changed thenature of digital
government. Technology is no longer deployed to merely
improve and streamline government service provision but also
to gather and link information in thepolicydomainsof careand
control. Information gathered and stored for the purpose of
service provisionmayalsoflow into applications andnetworks
created in light of government policies for care and control and
vice versa. Increasingly, digitised personal information plays
a vital role in policies for youth care and healthcare, and has
become indispensable in immigration policy and security
policy, both to fight crime for counter-terrorism purposes and
in the more everyday enforcement of the law (control).21 With
respect to security, information is passed not only between
national public organisations but also between states and
international organisations. Organisations with sometimes
fundamentally different tasks sometimes share and pool
information collected within their own field. The infrastruc-
tureofdigitisationand interoperabilitymakes itmucheasier to
pool information that was originally collected and stored in
what are essentially separate domains of service, care and
control. In the digital age, the boundaries between these
domains e which were never very sharply defined in the first
place e are becoming increasingly blurred.
2.2.4. Blurring the boundaries between the public and private
sphere
The importance of networks of actors and, in particular,
information also crosses the divide between public and
private information. The number of partnership and infor-
mation arrangements between public and private actors is
growing and gives rise to complex reciprocal information
interdependencies. Private and public information flows also
get blended together into these networks. The authorities are
17 D. Barney (2004) The network society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
18 M. Castells (1996) The rise of the network society. Cambridge MA:
Blackwell.
19 See for example: J. Whitson and K. Haggerty (2008) ‘Identity
theft and the care of the virtual self’, Economy and Society. Vol. 37,
nr. 4: 571e593.
20 Nationale Ombudsman, De burger in de ketens. Verslag van de
Nationale Ombudsman over 2008, (Year Report, 2008), The Hague
2009, p. 28.
21 D. Lyon, Surveillance after September 11. Cambridge 2003: Polity
Press; T. Monahan (2006; ed.) Surveillance and security. Technological
politics and power in everyday life. London: Routledge; see also the
special issue of the Web Journal Surveillance and Society, 2010, vol.
7, nr. 3/4 on ‘Surveillance, Children and Childhood’.
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increasingly interested in the information gathered by private
individuals and enterprises, and they make considerable use
of such information, as is for example illustrated by the
initiatives to provide passenger name records (PNR) and bank
data (SWIFT) to the US.22 At the national level, public
authorities such as the Tax Services, especially the Fraud
division, and the police use various sources of private infor-
mation in the execution of their duties. Also, government-
issued unique identifiers e such as the Dutch Citizens
Service Number e are increasingly used in the private sector,
irrespective of the fact this number is legally designated to be
used only in governmentecitizen interaction.23 Public-private
ventures in the digital age, for example in public trans-
portation or CCTV surveillance, also result in complicated
systems of pooled and shared information in which it is
sometimes difficult to keep the accessibility of the stored
personal and location information in line with the necessity
and authority to do so.24
2.2.5. Profiling citizens and pre-emptive policy
The growing number of information sources e and in partic-
ular the potential for interrelating and processing information
e and the simply vast quantity of stored data means that
governments increasingly (have to) make use of digital
profiling techniques, and as a result group citizens into cate-
gories and profiles. Profiling plays a growing role in policy and
policy implementation.25 Categorisation of citizens becomes
a dominant theme as government applies data mining and
other techniques to the information it has stored in order to
generate and combine a variety of information sources.26 To
some extent that is unavoidable: the amount of information
stored simply exceeds human capacity, forcing government to
turn to electronic processing and profiling. What this means
in everyday practice, however, is that people are linked to
a variety of profiles and ‘data doubles’.27 In other words,
people are represented by images put together from various
sources of information that sometimes take on a life of their
own in the systems maintained by government (and/or busi-
ness and industry).28 Such profiles consist of information that
is first decontextualized e taken out of the context in which it
was collected e and then recontextualized within the context
of the new composite profile. This process is naturally not an
exclusively technical affair (‘categories have politics’), nor is it
without social implications. Being pinned down to such
‘images of the future’ hinders the autonomy (freedom of
choice) of individuals in a way similar to the ‘images from the
past’ that linger so long due to the ICT-revolution.29 After all,
a profile amounts to a prognosis on the future identity of an
individual, based on his or her digital footprints. Government
also uses such processes to anticipate the future.30 For
example, profiles and information processes play a growing
role in ‘preventive policing’ or in the youth care sector, where
information gathering and data linkages are regarded as
indispensable for preventing the tragedy of child abuse.31
2.2.6. An unplanned result: beyond the eGovernment
paradigm
The traditional focus, contextual frameworks and aims of
eGovernment are being overtaken by day-to-day develop-
ments. The overlap between service, care and control, the
circulation of personal data within networks, the merging of
public and private information flows, and the tendency to use
digital profiles to pursue a proactive, forward-looking policy:
all these things result from a series of choices about individual
applications, new systems, and decisions regarding the
connections between them. Incremental change is the name
of the game. Out of these ‘small’ decisions, a de facto network
of information flows has evolved within the domain of
government that far outstrips the policy and conceptual
framework of eGovernment, even though it is constructed
under that banner.
Critics condemn government’s thirst for information and
the rapid exchange of data between government services,
drawing on images such as “Big Brother” and the “surveillance
society”.32 Although change is indeed taking place at
a considerable pace, such images are only marginally appli-
cable to the situation that has arisen, mainly because they
suggest an intention that is in fact absent: there is no
conspiracy or intrigue involved. There is no evil genius
designing the ‘surveillance state’. And at the same time, that
is almost exactly where the problem lies: this development is
much too incremental and unaccounted for; it is toomuch the
sum of decisions taken with respect to individual applications
and policies without much thought being given to an over-
riding awareness of the larger whole. There is no language
describing that awareness, and it certainly cannot be found in
22 P. De Hert, & B. de Schutter, “International transfers of data in
the field of JHA: The lessons of Europol, PNR and Swift”, pp.
299e335 in B. Martenczuk & S. van Thiel (eds.) Justice, Liberty,
Security: New challenges for eu external relations. Brussels: VUB Press
2008.
23 Prins et al. 2011, iGovernment.
24 Jacobs, B., ‘Architecture is politics: security and privacy issues
in transport and beyond’, pp. 289e299 in S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet &
P. de Hert (eds.) (2010), Data Protection in a Profiled World, Berlin:
Springer.
25 Schinkel, W. (2011) ‘Prepression: The actuarial archive and
new technologies of security’, Theoretical Criminology, vol. 15, no.
4: 365e380.
26 M. Hildebrandt, “Defining profiling: A new type of knowledge”,
pp. 17e45 in M. Hildebrandt & S. Gutwirth (eds.) Profiling the
European Citizen. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Belgium/
Netherlands 2008: Springer.
27 Haggerty, K. and Erickson, R. (2000) ‘The surveillant assem-
blage’, British Journal of Sociology, 51(4), pp. 605e22.
28 B.E. Harcourt, Against prediction: profiling, policing, and punishing
in an actuarial age, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007; see
also S. Baker (2008) The Numerati.
29 See V. Mayer-Schönberger 2009 Delete.
30 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, A surveillance
society? Fifth Report of Session 2007e08 (2 Volumes), London 2008:
Stationery Office; House of Lords, Surveillance: Citizens and the
State, London: 6 February 2009.
31 See for example: E. Keymolen and D. Broeders (2011) ‘Inno-
cence Lost: care and control in Dutch digital youth care’. The
British Journal of Social Work, online First, 6 December 2011.
32 See more in general on this: D. Lyon, The electronic eye. The rise
of surveillance society, Cambridge 1994: Polity Press. See also
contributions in: M. Hildebrandt & S. Gutwirth (eds.), Profiling the
European citizen. Cross-disciplinary perspectives, Belgium/
Netherlands 2008: Springer.
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the discourse of eGovernment. Indeed, it is the eGovernment
discourse that is depoliticising, instrumentalising and neu-
tralising developments, even as the developments themselves
require just the opposite. We therefore argue that a new
perspective, the iGovernment, is needed to analyse and
understand current developments in ICT and government and
to provide a framework for future policies.
3. iGovernment
3.1. The iGovernment paradigm
In order properly assess the developments described above
and provide guidelines for a new policy, we must begin to use
the designation “iGovernment”. In the words of Mayer-
Schönberger and Lazer, the term iGovernment (“information
Government”) is a “conceptual lens that offers a complemen-
tary perspective to understand the changing nature of
government and its relationship to the citizenry”.33 It therefore
refers not only to the empirical existence of another kind of
government owing to the developments we have described,
but also represents anotherwayof looking at that government.
In iGovernment, theemphasis ison informationflowsandonly
in the second place on the technology that makes these infor-
mation flows possible. This starting point is of great conse-
quence, because political and public debate is dominated by
ICT projects, and thus always startse and often endsewith the
technology or even the specific technological application.
By emphasising information flows, the conceptual lens of
iGovernment shows that the trends and developments are
more closely interrelated in everyday reality than a discussion
of individual techniques and applications would show. The
conceptual lens of iGovernment also reveals that, despite
a few very modest attempts, many governments are as yet
unaware of the existence and implications of an all-
encompassing network of information flows, and are thus
unable to set out a course accordingly. Such awareness is
overdue because there are two characteristics of the de facto
evolution of iGovernment that, when combined, are undesir-
able, namely that it presents a paradox of political control and
that it may not know any natural limits to its growth.
3.2. The political paradox of iGovernment
In the evolution of digital government, many political deci-
sions have been made along the way, yet paradoxically the
political dimension has been entirely lacking in another
respect. The political paradox that presses increasingly for
attention is as follows: the connected reality of iGovernment
has not been legitimised by explicit political decision-making,
but is the result of many political and policy-related choices
pertaining to individual technical applications and connec-
tions between applications and/or systems. At the same time,
however, these individual choices are not simply a series of
coincidences, even though ICT solutions are often presented
or ‘sold’ as inevitabilities: they are in fact deliberate political
and policy-related choices with implications far wider than
the instrumental solving of problems.
Although public debate on government ICT is not rare, it
tends to be focused on the multifarious ways in which
systems can run aground and fail to solve the problems for
which they were created. But that does not in itself constitute
the real political dimension e and urgency e of iGovernment.
The normative picture of what is taking shape is rather opa-
que. iGovernment has its origins in the actors who recognise
and seize the new opportunities that ICT offers to meet their
responsibilities and achieve their aims, and who develop and
use the relevant tools. Inmany cases, they offer up awhole list
of reasons for using ICT to achieve a particular policy objec-
tive, with security and effectiveness/efficiency driving the
policy process onwards. At the same time, the quality of these
arguments that offer ICT its thrust is rarely put seriously to the
test. The same sometimes applies to the opposite corner of the
normative field. Values such as privacy and autonomy
(freedom of choice), which serve as a counterweight to the
driving interests, can also take on a Potemkin-like quality in
the hands of their proponents. Consequently, balanced
assessments of the broader implications of the introduction
a new ICT-application (and the new connections it entails) are
hard to find. This paucity of judgment can be seen as a sign
that the transparency and accountability of the political
process with regard to public digital affairs is insufficient.
Most political and policy-debates focus on, and result in,
isolated decisions relating to separate applications, ICT pro-
grammes and policy objectives. Only rarely is any thought
given to the informationflowsgeneratedvia theseapplications
andhowtheseflowsand their contents take shape in the larger
complex of government information processes. In many
instances, the decision-making process is repeated at a later
date for yet another application or new connection, or to give
yet another organisation access to existing information
networks, once again on an individual-case basis. In this
context, function creep is a protracted but to some extent
predictable process. The general public and government itself
often appear to be entirely unaware of the scale on which
information becomes networked and the impact thereof.
Although there is often concern about separate information
flows within a single policy area, about the information flow
generated by a specific application, or about an individual
connection, there ismuch less vigilance and concern about the
connection of information flows further down the line, when
they pass through various policy domains and are absorbed
into more extensive information networks. It is precisely the
absence of an overarching awareness or design of iGovern-
ment that has allowed a complex, differentiated and some-
times contradictory accumulation of formal and informal
policy development and implementation processes to arise,
that differs from one measure and policy issue to the next.
3.3. iGovernment without limits
The accumulation of ad hoc decisions and the lack of aware-
ness of the whole of the interconnected information networks
are permitting iGovernment to evolve without boundaries or
33 V. Mayer-Schönberger & D. Lazer, “From electronic government
to information government”, in V.Mayer-Schönberger andD. Lazer
(eds.)Governanceand information technology: fromelectronicgovernment
to information government, Cambridge, MA 2007: MIT Press, p. 5.
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limits to its growth. No one has restricted the dispersal of
individual applications or the linking up of information flows,
because no one has claimed stewardship of the whole. The
tendency to specialise and assign issues to well-established
political and administrative categories, with the associated
financial frameworks, prevents a broader orientation. It is
a pressing question whether and how limits can be defined to
the networking of information in the public domain.
3.3.1. Propelling forces
Our first observation is that it is mainly interests such as effec-
tiveness/efficiency and security that are propelling the intro-
duction of technological applications and the connections
between them. Certainly in thewake of 9/11, governments have
set up many databases for security and control purposes in an
effort to prevent a repeat of the disaster.34 The dynamic rela-
tionship between Justice and Home Affairs within EU policy-
making isagoodexampleofhowtheprotectionofpersonaldata
has, time and again, been forced to give way to security
concerns, with the European Parliament exercising only
a minimum level of supervision. But “techno-trust” has also
prevailed in recent years, pushing such popular phenomena as
predictive policing and proactive management of citizens’
future behaviour to the foreground. That has, in turn, put pres-
sure on such concepts as “innocent until proven guilty”35 and
“cleaning the slate” in the criminal law.36 The emphasis on
effectiveness/efficiency and security means that fundamental
interests such as freedomof choice andprivacyhave often been
side-lined or downplayed. When it comes to individual appli-
cations and connections between databases and systems, one
can always find a good reason (usually political) for letting
security outweigh other considerations e necessity knows no
law, after all. But if no one is aware of the result at an aggregate
level, the sum total of all those individual reasons will not be
taken into account. That is why the absence of limits upon the
growth of information networks is most obvious when we shift
our perspective from individual applications to iGovernment as
a networked entity. Although the politicians and policymakers
involved do weigh up the interests underlying each new appli-
cation or initiative, for example security, privacy or freedom of
choice, that process does not involve their assessing these
interests at the level of aggregated information flows, i.e. at the
level of iGovernment as a whole e even though the application
will ultimately become part of the evolving iGovernment.
3.3.2. Pooling of information
The absence of limits can especially be gauged in the growing
overlap between thepolicydomains of service, care and control.
The emphasis on effectiveness/efficiency and security makes it
appealing tobreakdownbarriers betweendifferent information
domains in order to increase security, expand the scope of
control, or streamline services. It also makes it easier to defend
such measures politically. The domains of care and control
(social safety nets) are being “mixed” in the youth care sector;
control and service are crossing paths in various Internet
initiatives launched by the police; and the development of new
ID-card initiatives is keying into new ambitions related to both
service and control.37 Facilitated by unique ID codes (including
the unique ID-numbers and biometrics), it has become possible
to link a whole array of facts to a person and to share that data
beyond the boundaries of what used to be isolated policy
contextsandarestricted institutionalsetting. Ineverydayterms,
a citizen who has filled in a form for, say, a building permission
should no longer be surprised to find that information resur-
facing ina tax assessmente if resurfacing is even the rightword
for theoften subterraneousway inwhich information is reused.
Influencedbythese trendsanddevelopments,organisations
are reassessing their own role and aims. Occasionally that
means that they adjust their work processes and extend their
scope of activity by developing new products and services in
areas of policy where they had previously not been active.
Viewed from theperspective of informationflowsanddatause,
the three policy domains of care, control and service are
increasingly becoming an integrated component of public
administration, even though they are in noway comparable or
easy to integrate in terms of policy goals, administrative infra-
structure, accountability mechanisms, legal rules and other
frameworks.Asaresult, tensionarises regardingduties,powers
and responsibilities, in particular because former “outsiders”
(including private-sector parties) become part of the network.
4. The risks involved
iGovernment “without limits” poses certain risks and prob-
lems, not only directly, but also because opportunities to
harness the potential of iGovernment are ignored or not
exploited to the full. As iGovernment continues to evolve,
a number of these risks must be addressed.
4.1. Distorted images
The first risk is that the solid basis government believes infor-
mation technologywill give it inaparticular policydomainmay
turn out to be quite the opposite within the overall context of
networked information systems. In the system-by-system
approach described above, new applications are assessed
individually and in isolated policy contexts, rather than in
relation to the existing technologies and applications and the
information networks in which they will be functioning. As
a result, there is no clear picture of, or critical reflection on, the
wider implications of any specific initiative. Ultimately, the
image that government has of its own information-reality
becomes distorted in this way. It fails to sufficiently identify,
acknowledge and review the underlying and broader interests
or theproblemsand risks that arebound toarisewhen separate
initiatives are combined. Being blind to the implications of
34 United Nations, From e-Government to Connected Governance,
United Nations e-Government Survey 2008, New York.
35 L. Zedner, “Pre-crime and post-criminology”, Theoretical Crim-
inology, 2007 vol. 11: 261e281.
36 D. Solove, The future of reputation, gossip, rumor and privacy on
the internet, New Haven, CT 2007: Yale University Press; V. Mayer-
Schönberger, Delete. The virtue of forgetting in the digital age,
Princeton 2009: Princeton University Press.
37 T. Stevens, J. Elliott, A. Hoikkanen, I. Maghiros & W. Lusoli, The
State of the Electronic Identity Market: Technologies, Infrastructure,
Services and Policies, JRC Scientific and Technical Reports,
Luxembourg 2010: Publications Office of the European Union.
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combining informationflowsmay lead tounpleasant surprises.
Identity fraud is oneexample.38Herewehaveonly just begun to
take stock of the underlying problems. Combining, processing
and decontextualizing information are all processes that affect
the quality and reliability of that information.Although the aim
is to increase control, poor information quality can cloud
government’s view, cause its institutions and agencies to
mistrust one another, leading instead to deterioration in
control. There is a growing list of unfortunate cases: mistaken
identity, incorrect and obsolete records that have material
consequences, citizens who get bogged down in digital
government networks. The risk is that politicians and policy-
makers will lose the ability to orchestrate matters; they will
thenhave todowhat they can toprevent thenegative impact of
an ad hoc iGovernment from outweighing the benefits of ICT.
4.2. Informational prowess without corresponding
institutional adjustments
The second risk is related to the observation that the present
discourse concentrates on technological systems instead of
organisational processes. The focus, in other words, is on the
product, and not on the process. The debate focuses on the
technical possibilities, whereas the, often plural, organisational
and institutional contexts in which the technology is meant to
function is insufficiently consideredor fade into the background.
And yet it is precisely this context that is of vital importance for
ensuring that the system, once it is operational, actually meets
the public’s quality standards. The smooth integration (in terms
ofworkprocesses,authorizationsetc.)ofnewpolicy-orientedICT
systems in the setup of the organisations involved is perhaps as
important as the strictly technical performance of the system in
question, yet it receives much less consideration. The organisa-
tions themselves thus have an interest in attending to the ‘soft’
side of technological systems. But the larger issue is the position
of the citizen. The development of iGovernment has involved
adramatic increase in the informationalprowessofgovernment,
without offering citizens any tools to serve as a counterweight to
this. For citizenscaught in the sticky threadsof thegovernment’s
information systems, there is no institutional redress that is
networked in a way similar to the information itself. Rather, the
safeguardse e.g. statutory rights of access and correctionof data
e remain rectilinear and therefore increasingly inadequate. It
will be highly problematic if the thrust of iGovernment becomes
so dominant that organisations are fully connected in terms of
informationflowsbutnot in termsof institutionalarrangements.
Questions of accountability and transparency must be taken up
on the scale of the overarching iGovernment, in order to prevent
these values from falling through the cracks. This involves
amajor (andambitious) reworkingof the legalandorganisational
structures meant to protect citizens against unwarranted or
incorrect information use.
4.3. Tenuous public trust
The third risk is that a lack of boundaries will eventually
undermine the citizen’s confidence in government as
a reliable custodian and user of information. If there is no
serious consideration of the features and requirements, and
also of the new risks, of iGovernment, then government
becomes vulnerable in its belief that technology works
perfectly. This vulnerability is only heightened by the fact that
digital systems have become a vital infrastructure. Without
such reflection, matters such as transparency, accountability
and good commissioning practices are at risk, whereas it is
precisely these qualities that promote trust in digital govern-
ment. Government must be able to ensure that information
flows within its own systemse and to a certain extent outside
those systems e do not become so unmanageable that they
end up harming citizens: or, for that matter, harming the
digital reputation of government itself.
Although it is too soon to draw clear-cut conclusions, the
public’s trust in government is already showing some cracks.
There are various examples: the campaigns of grassroots
movements39; and the court cases initiated by individuals,
organisationsandeventheEuropeanParliament (e.g. in thecase
of Passenger Name Records). Headline cases such as the T-
Mobileaffair inGermanyandthemajorbreachesofdatasecurity
in the UK can severely test the public’s confidence in govern-
ment.40 Trust-related risks are not only a factor in the relation-
ship between government and the citizen, but also within
government itself, in particular in the relationship between
policymaking and policy implementation. Both the ministries
(policymakers)andtheagenciesandothergovernmentbodiesat
operational level (policy implementation) have expressed
a strong need for clear guidance, not in the least to make prac-
tical management of information systems and networks
possible.41This increasinggapbetweenpolicymakingandpolicy
implementation can be attributed to the lack of iGovernment
self-awareness among policymakers and politicians. In the
38 J. Whitson & K.D. Haggerty, “Identity theft and the care of the
virtual self”, Economy and Society 2008, 37 (4): 571e593.
39 See in The Netherlands: <http://www.njcm.nl/site/press_
releases/show/25>; <http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/
nieuws/2009/07/protest-tegen-opslagvingerafdruk.121883.
lynkx>. Of interest is also the ruling by the Dutch Advertising
Code Authority (Reclame Code Commissie), Amsterdam 12 January
2010, in a case against a grassroots movement that had satirically
depicted the Dutch central ID-number as a tattoo on the arm, in
a widely distributed faux government flyer, that many people
(chillingly) considered real. Other examples can be found in: J.E.J.
Prins, “Burgers en hun privacy: over verhouding en houding tot
een ongemakkelijk bezit”, pp. 1e14 in J.E.J. Prins (red.) 16 miljoen
BN’ers? Bescherming van persoonsgegevens in het Digitale Tijdperk,
Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 2010.
40 In Germany, more than 17 million customer datasets were
stolen from T-Mobile in 2006. The data included mobile telephone
numbers (including unlisted ones), addresses, birthdates and e-
mail addresses. All this data was offered to criminals via the
Internet. There were a series of breaches of data security in the
UK in recent years (i.e. secure information that was uninten-
tionally made available in an insecure context). The cases
included the loss of two computer discs storing data on 25 million
child benefit recipients (November 2007); a stolen laptop with
personal data on 600,000 Royal Navy recruits (January 2008); six
stolen laptops with data on 20,000 patients (June 2008) (www.bbc.
co.uk, consulted on 22 January 2009).
41 This conclusion is based on numerous interviews with
professionals working at various levels of the Dutch government.
References to their names and affiliations can be found in the
report iGovernment (footnote 4).
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prevailing instrumental perception of ICT projects, there is no
room for addressing the organisational difficulties that are
nevertheless in full view in the daily operations of public
authorities at all levels. It is crucial to address that gap, not only
in order to guarantee government’s (and therefore iGovern-
ment’s) ability to act decisively, but also to retain the trust of the
various parties within government itself.
5. Adjusting to the reality of iGovernment
5.1. Self-aware iGovernment
From the analysis above follows our main conclusion: the use
of ICT and, in particular, of information/information flows is
bringing about major changes in both policymaking/policy
implementation and social reality, which means that, in
effect, a different government is now evolving. That new
government is what this article calls “iGovernment”. It is the
nature of the new iGovernment to focus on information flows
and related processes. Technology is not the leading factor
here; rather, it is a facilitator. iGovernment is being created
through the incremental accumulation of de facto initiatives
that are insufficiently acknowledged as being part of a larger
whole or questioned by the relevant actors. This lack of
“awareness” means that the features of iGovernment are
scarcely taken into account in policymaking, and that politi-
cians and policymakers do not sufficiently realise precisely
what is taking shape, let alone how they can guide that
evolution in the right direction. What they require is
a different perspective. The evidence indicates that, if left to
its own devices, iGovernment will continue “naturally” in the
sameway that is has evolved so far: it will develop organically
through the continuous amassing of applications and infor-
mation flows. A shift in focus is needed to correct the failing
awareness of this process and its consequences.
5.2. Administrative principles for iGovernment
Several matters are of vital importance in making the political
transformation from eGovernment to iGovernment. First it
requires that governmentbecomesmuchmoreawareofvarious
features of information than is now the case. We are referring
here to processes of information handling and use, specifically
because such processes have a huge impact on the nature and
reliability of the information that feeds iGovernment. We can
therefore tag three interrelated processes with ‘warning flags’:
when information is either part of or the result of these
processes, governmentmustpaystrict attention to thequalityof
the informationandconsiderwhobears responsibility for it. The
three processes that must be flagged in this way are:
 The networking of information, i.e. the shared use and
management of information within a network of actors.
 The compiling and enhancing of information, i.e. creating new
information and profiles based on different sources in
different contexts.
 Pursuing preventive and proactive policy based on informa-
tion, i.e. actively evaluating and intervening in society based
on an information-driven risk calculation.
These three information processes are the core of iGo-
vernment and enable it to fine-tune and customise policy,
obtain a comprehensive picture of the public and of the policy
issues, and take proactive action where needed. At the same
time, they are processes that themselves have an impact on
information: they influence its nature, reliability, recognis-
ability, contextuality and traceability. It is important to real-
ise, much more so than is now the case, that it is precisely
these three processes that are having a big impact on (a) the
quality of information content and (b) the demands made on
the organisational context of information flows. The quality
and vulnerability of information and information processes
therefore require constant, proactive vigilance throughout all
branches of national government.
Government must also have a much larger measure of
openness and transparency, so that citizens can be helped to
understand what information is being collected on them and
assist them in correcting it where necessary. At the moment,
citizens are almost powerless to correct errors in personal
information within the vast iGovernment information
networks e errors that sometimes have huge repercussions.
Moreover, iGovernment’s digital “memory” demands partic-
ular attention. Both the importance of “forgetting” e people
should not be judged eternally on the information that
governmenthasstoredabout themeandof ‘remembering’, i.e.
government’s legal obligation of archiving, require a radical
cultural transformation and a firmly grounded strategy that is
as yet lacking. Interestingly, the European Commission
proposes to introduce the right to forget as part of its proposal
for a revision of Data Protection Directive 95/46.42
Second, the scrupulous development of iGovernment also
means being prepared to set limits to it. When iGovernment is
not self-aware, its natural tendency will be to continue
expanding. Although it is beyond the bounds of this article to
define the limits that may be necessary e in essence, that is
a political matter e it can be indicated where those limits
might approximately be found. In the first place, limits flow
from a more realistic balancing of the fundamental interests
at stake. As noted above, the normative picture that arises
form current political and policy-debates is exceedingly
vague. Other inducements to limit-setting may lie in an
assessment of the consequences of the intertwinement of
policy domains (service, care and control), and of the diffuse
boundaries between public and private information flows.
What is also of great importance is the fact that the Internet
has created an entirely different information environment,
one from which iGovernment cannot withdraw and within
which it is obliged to function. The relationship to this “world
outside” also makes it very important to set well-reasoned
limits, as was made very clear by the Wikileaks affair.
Thirdly, prudent efforts to build iGovernment require
changes at an institutional level. A government that has taken
42 COM (2012) 11 final, Brussels January 25, 2012. Article 17
provides the data subject’s right to be forgotten and to erasure.
See also: Paragraph 3.4 (p. 10) of the Proposal’s Explanatory
Memorandum. For a discussion of the proposal, see: Christopher
Kuner, “The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection
Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection
Law”, Privacy and Security Law Report, 11 PVLR 06, 02/06/2012. 1.
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on another guise in the digital world must also make the
necessary organisational changes. When government is linked
up in termsof its informationflows, theaccountability structure
must fit inwith this new reality and operate with the necessary
efficiency. “iGovernment self-awareness” is not just a status to
enjoy, but rather an ongoing challenge that must ultimately be
ingrained in every tier of government. The key mission here is
that government improves its accountability vis-à-vis individ-
uals who become entangled in information networks. Also, it
must increase the transparency of iGovernment vis-à-vis citi-
zens. The puzzle must be solved of how to organise the protec-
tion of citizens in a fashion that is as networked as everything
else. Governments in all modern countries face a crucial chal-
lenge: theymust bewilling and able tomove the focus of debate
fromtechnologyandindividualapplicationstoanewlevel, i.e. to
interrelated information processes and linked information.
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